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Abstract
Use of Private Security Companies (PSCs) and Private Military Companies (PMCs) in conflict and 
post-conflict countries has been the subject of ongoing critical discussion among scholars and media 
for many years. This paper assesses the legal status and responsibilities of PSCs and PMCs, and their 
operation in Timor-Leste where they are not properly regulated. It examines key legal issues, such as their 
definition and roles, scope and limits of operations, approved and prohibited activities, accountability, and 
monitoring. The paper also examines the impact of PSCs and PMCs on Timor-Leste law and society and 
offers astatutory framework for their management and regulation.
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Intisari
Implementasi Private Security Companies (PSCs) dan Private Military Companies (PMCs) dalam negara 
yang sedang berkonflik dan pasca berkonflik telah menjadi subjek pembahasan penting diantara akademisi 
dan media massa selama bertahun-tahun. Penulisan ini akan menilai status hukum dan kewajiban PSCs 
dan PMCs, dan pelaksanaan kerja kedua lembaga tersebut di Timor-Leste dimana belum ada pengaturan 
yang mumpuni. Penulisan ini menganalisa isu-isu krusial mengenai beberapa pengaturan, seperti definisi 
dan peran, batasan dan ruang lingkup kerja, aktivitas yang diperbolehkan dan yang dilarang, akuntabilitas, 
serta pengawasan. Penulisan ini juga menganalisa implikasi dari PSCs dan PMCs  di tatanan hukum 
dan masyarakat Timor-Leste, serta menawarkan sebuah kerangka undang-undang untuk manajerial dan 
pengaturan kedua lembaga tersebut.
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A. Background
Private Security Companies (PSCs) and 
Private Military Companies (PMCs) have existed 
and operated for many generations in one guise 
or another, but they have gained emerging and 
prominent profiles with the demise of the Soviet 
Union and the end of the Cold War. After the 
Cold War, many countries that had once allied 
themselves to the Soviet Union or the United 
States started to experience an increasing number 
of armed conflicts from both internal and external 
sources that the superpowers previously would have 
kept under control and prevented from spreading.1 
Furthermore, domestic conditions deteriorated with 
the absence of well-established authority in these 
countries and inadequate armed forces and law 
security agencies with capability to maintain order 
and internal security.2 These state organs were often 
incapable of maintaining adequate capacity and 
capability levels without the support and assistances 
similar to that received during the Cold War period 
from the superpower countries.3
These post-Cold War conditions provided a 
suitable environment for the development of PSCs 
and PMCs, since the companies were eager to fill 
the security void left by the superpowers.4 Countries 
that once depended on the superpowers now turned 
to PSCs and PMCs in order to support and maintain 
their internal security, thereby creating demand for 
the security market.5
This paper assesses the legal status and 
responsibilities of PSCs and PMCs in Timor-Leste, 
in the absence of proper regulation. It examines key 
legal issues, such as definition, the scope and limits 
of operations, approved and prohibited activities, 
accountability, and the regulatory framework for 
PSC and PMC monitoring and management. It also 
examines their impact on Timor-Leste society and 
offers a statute for their management and regulation. 
B. Research Methods
The methodology of this research is normative 
legal research, based on core principles, norms, and 
regulations of legal frameworks. It relies on primary 
and secondary data gathered from the Timor-Leste 
government, PSC offices in Timor-Leste, and United 
Nations documents relating to PSCs and PMCs. It 
also utilises national legislations relating to the use 
of PSCs and PMCs from other countries, such as the 
United States, the United Kingdom, South Africa, 
and Indonesia.
C. Research Results and Discussion
1.	 Definition,	Legal	Status,	and	Accountability	
of PSCs and PMCs
The International Code of Conduct for 
Private Security Services Providers, a joint initiative 
sponsored by the International Committee of the 
Red Cross and the Swiss Government, defines 
PSCs as companies whose business activities 
include the provision of security services either on 
its own behalf or on behalf of another, irrespective 
of how such a company describes itself.6 In respect 
of PMCs, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic 
Control of Armed Forcesdescribes such companies 
as ‘business that offers specialised services related 
to war and conflict, including combat operations, 
strategic planning, intelligence collection, 
operational and logistical support, training, 
procurement and maintenance.7
However, in a number of areas of operation, 
such as Iraq and Afghanistan, it has been very 
difficult to distinguish between PSCs and PMCs in 
practical terms, since both organisations frequently 
1  Peter Singer, 2003, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, Cornell University Press, New York, p. 50.
2 Ibid., pp. 50-51.
3  Ibid.
4  Ibid.
5  Regions and countries making increasing use of PSCs and PMCs since the end of the Cold War, include, but are certainly not limited to, 
Africa (Angola, Congo, Sierra Leone, South Africa), Latin & South America (Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador) the Balkans (Croatia, Bosnia, 
Kosovo), and South East Asia (The Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste).  But they have also been utilised in operations in conflict 
regions in support of the occupying powers, as has occurred in Afghanistan and Iraq.
6 Section B Definitions International Code of Conduct for Private Security Services Providers opened for signature 9 November 2012.
7  Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, “Private Military Companies”, http://www.dcaf.ch/content/download/34953/ 
525123/file/bg_private-military-companies.pdf, accessed on 30 June 2014.
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perform the same or similar types of tasks. This 
difficulty is exacerbated by the lack of statutory 
instruments defining PSCs and PMCs and their 
legal status.8 Additionally, some PMCs describe 
themselves as PSCs because they perform security 
services usually conducted by PSCs, and to avoid 
negative public attention and monitoring by external 
regulations that could have negative impact on their 
business development.9
Nevertheless, they are two different 
organisations, with PMCs having a military nature 
and most PSCs being more civilian and ancillary to 
law enforcement in nature. To distinguish between 
the types of companies, anapproach that reviews 
their activities in the areas of operation is required, 
taking account of the condition of the states where 
they conduct their operations and whether or not 
they are conducted in peaceful or in armed conflict 
situations. 
PSC and PMC legal status has become the 
subject of much discussion among scholars. Parker 
argues that the nature of the services and tasks of 
PSCs and PMCs determine the classification of 
their legal status, even when there is no agreed 
definition for non-state security providers whether 
they are PSCs, PMCs, or just mercenary forces.10 
Besides depending on the nature of their activities, 
Gillard also suggests that the legal status of PSCs 
and PMCs in conflict situations should also be 
determined on a case-by-case basis and include 
identification of the client and whether the company 
should be categorised as a member of an armed 
force.11 Determination of legal status should also 
include area of operation, since PSC and PMC 
activities or services will vary in different locations, 
depending on whether the area of operation is in a 
conflict zone or in a civil context.12 PSC and PMC 
personnel nationality is also a factor since legal 
status in international humanitarian law may depend 
upon the subject’s nationality.
In respect of accountability, PSCs and PMCs 
and their personnel should be subject to prosecution 
for their wrongdoings, misconduct or crimes, 
particularly for actions or activities that could be 
categorised as crimes against humanity or war 
crimes. While prosecution could occur in courts 
intheir state of registration, in the contracting state, 
or in the state where operations are conducted, legal 
proceedings against PSC or PMC personnel have 
been rare because of a variety of factors, some legal, 
and others more practical and political.13 Firstly, the 
contracting state, may give immunity to prosecution 
to PSCs or PMCs and their personnel. Secondly, 
the courts may have stopped functioning due to the 
conflict situation. Thirdly, the contracting and home 
states may not be able to exercise extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over PSCs and PMCs because of the 
absence of national legislation or reluctance to 
prosecute violations occurring overseas for practical 
and political reasons. Fourthly, proceedings would 
be complicated, even if a home or contracting 
state court is able and willing to do so, because 
of evidence and witnesses likely to be in another 
country.
But prosecution of PSCs and PMCs and 
their personnelcan occur if there is a political will, 
which will also reduce or eliminate the presumption 
that the prosecution of private actors cannot be 
conducted due to a legal vacuum. Theiroversight by 
a state regulatory body, the insertion of human rights 
8  Katherine Fallah,”Corporate Actors: the Legal Status of Mercenaries in Armed Conflict”, International Review of the Red Cross,Vol. 88, No. 
863, September 2006, p. 602.
9 University Centre for International Humanitarian Law Geneva, “Expert Meeting on Private Military Contractors: Status and State 
Responsibility for Their Actions”, http://www.geneva-academy.ch/docs/expert-meetings/2005/2rapport_compagnies_privees.pdf, accessed 
on 30 August 2005, p. 62.
10  Sarah Parker, “Handle with Care: Private Security Companies in Timor-Leste”, http://www.timor-leste-violence.org/pdfs/Timor-Leste-
Violence-Private-Security-Companies.pdf, accessed on 30 June 2014.
11 Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, “Business Goes to War: Private Military/Security Companies and International Humanitarian Law”, International 
Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 88, No. 863, September 2006, p. 539.
12  Statement 24 and Explanatory Commentary Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States 
related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict, 2008.
13 Emanuela Chiara Gillard, Op.cit., p. 543.
475Soares and Price, Regulating Private Security Companies (PSCs) and Private Military Companies (PMCs)
obligations into company contracts and a licencing 
mechanism are ways to ensure these companies 
respect of legal obligations and human rights.14
2. Contracting PSCs and PMCs
Avant suggests that governments hire PSCs 
and PMCs for a number of differing reasons, such 
as:
a. Surge and Flexibility
 PSCs and PMCs have the capability to 
quickly recruit the necessary personnel 
and to deploy them to an operational 
area, without any delaying political or 
bureaucraticobstacles or intervention. 
Once theoperation is complete, they 
can quickly conclude the contract and 
extract the personnel. This capacity 
enables the contracting state to avoid 
the likely slow and cumbersome 
processes it would otherwise face in 
deploying and standing down its own 
large military force.15
b. Specialized skills
 PSCs and PMCs, through their 
databases or direct recruitment, can 
provide the contracting government 
with specialised personnel with 
particular skills matching operational 
requirements or needs. This matching 
process can be much harder to effect 
and more complex if conducted by 
the bureaucratic machinery of the 
government itself.16
c. Decreased political costs
 There is less political damage for the 
contracting stateif it does not appear to 
be directly conducting an operation.17
However, Avant also states that PSCand PMC 
utilisation has costs and risks for a contracting state, 
namely practical problems, and political risks. The 
practical problems encompass: 
a. Cost
 PSCs and PMCs contracting cost 
is influenced by such factorsas the 
uncertain and dangerous environment 
in which a company is, or will be, 
operating, the current market forces 
for skilled personnel, and company 
insurance rates.18 Hence, there is 
potential for PSCs and PMCs to 
become more expensive than national 
armed forces in certain situations, 
particularly where a contracting state 
is primarily interested in outcomes 
rather than costs.
b. Reliability
 Efforts by the contracting state to 
minimize costs may adversely affect 
the quality of PSC and PMC services, 
as the contracted companies endeavour 
to deploy fewer skilled personnel or 
otherwise reduce services.19
c. Integration
 PSCs and PMCs can hinder unified 
responses to dangerous conditions 
which can generate conflict with 
domestic military forces, particularly 
with uncertainty over rules of 
engagement, absence of shared 
knowledge of armed movements, and 
lack of communication over missions. 
Furthermore, PSCs and PMCs 
changing terms of contracts in areas 
of operationbecome problematic if 
military field commanders lack direct 
authority over PSC and PMC personnel. 
Field commanders may face difficulties 
coordinating and changing PSC and 
PMC services in order to meet more 
immediate operational requirements. 
These difficulties can be exacerbated 
by poor coordination between various 
government departments with separate 
responsibilities relating to PSC and 
PMC contracts and operations.20
d. Legal uncertainty
 The use of PSCs and PMCs gives rise 
to issues relating to accountability 
because of the lack of certainty over 
theirlegal status – including whether 
14  Ibid.
15 Deborah Avant, “Privatization of Security: Lesson from Iraq”, Orbis, Vol. 50, No. 2, 2006, p. 331. 
16 Ibid., p. 331-332. 
17  Ibid.
18 Ibid., p. 332-333. 
19  Ibid., p. 336.
20  Ibid., p. 337. An example of this poor coordination was the action by the PMC Triple Canopy to allegedly obtain illegal firearms in order to 
fulfil its contract with the US State Department to protect State Department personnel in Iraq when the US Office of Defence Trade Controls 
(which is also part of the State Department) did not provide the company with the necessary and requisite US firearms export licenses.
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they can even be subject to certain 
national laws or rules. For example, 
PSCs and PMCs contracted to the US 
Government and operating in Iraq can 
enjoy immunity generally under the 
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 
between the United States and Iraq.21
Accordingly, PSC and PMC personnel coming 
within the provisions of the SOFA have not been 
subject to Iraqi laws in respect of their contractual 
activities:
Contractors shall not be subject to Iraqi laws 
or regulations in matters relating to the terms 
and conditions of their Contracts, including 
licensing and registering employees, 
businesses and corporations; provided, 
however, that Contractors shall comply with 
such applicable licensing and registration 
laws and regulations if engaging in business 
or transactions in Iraq other than Contracts.22
Avant’s political risks cover includes the following 
issues:23
a. Military Profession
 Deployment of military forces can 
be very costly or even ruinous for a 
fragile economy, and outsourcing may 
be seen as a way to avoid such financial 
burden. However, PSC and PMC use 
may undermine the military and its 
professional capabilities and ethos. 
Furthermore, the PSC and PMC sector 
may cause a negative retention impact 
on the military, possibly pressuring 
military leadership to compete with 
PSCs and PMCs.
b. Democratic Restraint
 Utilising PSCs and PMCs may lead 
to the reduction of transparency, 
with a consequent negative political 
impact on government policy and 
undermining of the capacity to hold 
governments accountable for their 
decisions and actions.
Wing suggests that PSCs and PMCs can grow 
and expand their activities because governments, 
particularly western governments, are unwilling 
to face political backlash by exposing their armed 
forces personnel to risk of death and injury.24 Luttwak 
suggests that, although the public generally approve 
of the armed forces, they oppose family members 
in combat situations in which death and injuryare 
occupational hazards.25 Thus, PSC and PMC 
utilisation may be a solution for a government as 
an alternative to national armed forces deployment.
The presence of these companies in a 
country can be attributed to several factors, such as 
opportunity for economic gain, unstable conditions, 
and lack of regulatory legal instruments (described 
by Faite as the ‘legal vacuum’).26 Opportunity for 
economic gain can be the main reason for PSCs to 
conduct operations in a country.27 Pay rates available 
to PSC and PMC personnel can be significantly 
higher than those in national armed forces, and thus 
an attraction for former military personnel to join 
the companies.28 Since PSCs and PMCs are hired 
to provide security, they may have little interest in 
21  See Article 12 Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq 
and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq, 17 November 2008.
22 Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 17 (Revised), S. 4 (2) (Iraq).
23 Deborah Avant, “Privatization of Security: Lesson from Iraq”, Orbis, Vol. 50, No. 2, 2006, p. 340. 
24  Ian Wing, “Private Military Companies and Military Operations”, Australian Army Land Warfare Studies Centre, Paper No. 138, October 
2010, p. 19.
25 Edward Luttwak, “Where are the Great Powers”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4, 1994, p. 25.
26 Alexander Faite, “Involvement of Private Contractors in Armed Conflict: Implication under International Humanitarian Law”, Defense 
Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2004, p. 12.
27  For example, the US Congressional Budget Office estimated that the US Government expended $6-10 billion on PSCs and PMCs during 2003 
- 2007, and specifically allocated $3-4 billion for PSC and PMC operations in Iraq, see Congress of The United States Congressional Budget 
Office, “Contractor’s Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq”, http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/08-12-iraqcontractors.pdf, accessed on 2014. 
In 1997, the PMC Sandline received contracts worth around $36 million from the Papua New Guinea government for its first three months, 
and $45 million in its first year of operations;in Africa, the PMC Executive Outcome earned $55 million between 1998 and 2002, not including 
its Sierra Leone contract which was worth an extra $1.8 million per month. See also Sam Vaknin, “Private Armies”, http://www.sandline.com/
hotlinks/private_armies.html, accessed on 30 June 2014.
28 Ian Wing, Op.cit., p. 17.  For example, in Iraq during 2003 US, UK and Australian PSC and PMC personnel with “special forces” expertise, 
could expect to receive around US$2000 per day, although this could eventually reduce to $700 per day. On the other hand, PSC and PMC 
personnel from non-Western countries and Iraqi personnel might be paid around US$50 per day for similar tasks.
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ending a conflict or improvinga security situation, 
since this would cause their personnel to lose a 
lucrative source of income or other financial return. 
Instability conditions caused by civil unrest, 
internal conflicts, or breakdown of state law and 
order can create an environment conducive for 
PSC and PMC operations. This situation usually 
occurs in conflict or post-conflict countries where 
governments cannot maintain their own security, 
thereby enabling PSCs and PMCs to deliver that 
security requirement. The combination of unstable 
conditions and economic gain can occur in particular 
in a country which has vast deposits of natural 
resources by providing opportunity for further PSC 
or PMC wealth generation through the granting of 
licences, concessions or sale over those resources as 
payment in kind for security services. 
A legal vacuum can also be an attraction 
for PSC and PMC operation since the lack of 
legislation or regulation enables them to operate 
without restraint. Even where a law or regulation 
does exist, implementation may be non-existent 
due to inadequacies in the enforcement regime or 
the government of the state grants immunities to the 
PSC or PMC operate in the country.
3. PSC and PMC Presence in Timor­Leste
Timor-Leste, as a post-conflict nation, 
provides a useful case-study of the operation of 
PSCs and PMCs. Ithas experienced major episodes 
of violence and civil unrest – both before and after 
independence in May 2002. These episodes required 
international peace-keeping interventions in 1999 
and again in 2006. The government has been able 
to provide only uncertain and limited security, 
and this has created a demand for the services of 
PSCs and PMCs. Additionally, Timor-Leste’s huge 
deposits of natural resources, especially oil and 
gas, have attracted many international companies 
– companies which are liable to become clients of 
PSCs and PMCs in light of the country’s fragile 
security situation. 
Timor-Leste’s security situation and 
the presence of international peace-keeping 
forceshavemade it an attractive environment for 
PSCs and PMCs. A growing number of PSCs are 
operating in Timor-Leste, and providing security 
services such as protection to various embassies, 
international agencies, government institutions, 
commercial and business premises, and private 
residences. They also provide secure money 
movement, security alarm systems and mobile rapid 
response, private investigation; and supply various 
forms of equipment to government institutions, 
including the Timor-Leste National Police (PNTL) 
and the Timor-Leste Defence Force (F-FDTL). 
While PSC personnel do not carry fire arms on 
operations, on occasion they carry non-lethal 
equipment, such as pepper spray, tasers and rubber 
batons. 
The majority of security-related companies 
operating in Timor-Leste are PSCs, since most of 
the services and day-to-day operations are more in 
the context law enforcement support rather than 
military operations. However, PMCs have also 
operated in the country and will likely continue to 
do so in the future.
Table 1.  Local PSCs Operating in Timor­Leste
Company Management Origin Commenced Services  Numbers
Maubere Security 
(Formerly Chub 
Security)
Timorese and 
Australian
2004 Civil security, electronic 
security, cleaner, fire 
extinguishing services.
1,300
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Gardamor Timorese 2007 Civil security & protection, 
close investigation, secure 
asset transfer,  body 
guards, fire protection & 
evacuation, cooperating with 
PNTL&Timorese Fire Brigade. 
2,500
APAC Security 
(formerly 
Seprositil)
Australian/US 2007 Security guarding  (including  
close protection), emergency 
response, asset transport, 
security consultation.
2,000
High Risk Security 
Group (Asia-
Pacific)
Australian 2004 Risk mitigation, physical & 
close personal protection, 
premium guard services, aero-
medical evacuation, paramedic 
services, security risk 
assessment, logistics, security 
awareness training, specialist 
security and law.
51-300
Gear Defence Timorese 2009 Equipment supply  to 
government departments.
+ 300
Source: Compiled by the author.
PSC presence in Timor-Leste has the capacity 
to produce two different results affectingnational 
security and recovery. Firstly, their presence may 
cause conflict and friction with the PNTL or the 
F-FDTL. This could happen where the Timorese 
population views PSCs or PMCs as providing 
security more effectively and efficiently than the 
PNTL or F-FDTL.29
Additionally, since PSC contracts are far 
too costly for much of the Timor-Leste population, 
those who live near or below the poverty line 
cannot access their security services. Consequently, 
if friction occurs between these socio-economic 
groups, PSCs can become involved in horizontal 
(class/economic) conflicts when acting on behalf of 
their wealthy clients.30
PMC presence in Timor-Leste does not attract 
much public attention, although some companies, 
such as the US-based DynCorp International, 
have played an increasing role in Timor-Leste’s 
post-independence period. DynCorp, for example, 
provided helicopter and satellite network 
communications support for the UN peacekeeping 
forces.31 The company currently maintains a very 
low profile locally and hence it is difficult to gain any 
confirmation on its current operations and activities. 
Itmightoperate inside the country in future as part 
of a visiting international force, as part of a foreign 
diplomatic corps, or under contract from the Timor-
Leste government itself. 
29  Nelson Belo, “Saida Mak Akontese Ba Kompaña Siguransa Privadu iha Futuru?”, Fundasaun Mahein, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2011, p. 1.
30  Sarah Parker, Loc.cit.
31  Peter Singer, 2003, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, Cornell University Press, New York, p. 14.
Table 2. Foreign PSCs and PMCs Operate in Timor­Leste
Company Company Type Country Commenced Services
Onix International PSC/PMC New 
Zealand
Since 2000 Hostage Rescue Operation 
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DynCorp 
International
PMC US Since 1999 Supporting UNTAET 
administration & peacekeeping; 
US Forces operations in Timor-
Leste; services to Timor-Leste 
Government - PNTL training, 
F-FDTL logistic support, 
& assisting anti-corruption 
campaign.
Academia (Formerly 
Blackwater  
International 
Xe Service)
PMC US Exact year of 
first operation  
uncertain
Exact activities in Timor-Leste 
unidentified.
Source: Compiled by the author.
There are reports of PSCs and PMCs in 
a country being accused of committing serious 
violations of laws or even basic human rights during 
their operations; for example, DynCorp has been 
the subject of a number of serious allegations.32 
The prevalence of such reports, even if not always 
substantiated, reinforces the importance for the 
Timor-Leste Government to regulate PSCs and 
PMCs, in order to avoid the grave violations 
that have allegedly occurred in Bosnia, Iraq and 
Afghanistan.
4. PSC and PMC Regulation in Timor­Leste 
Legal System
In August 2010, the Timor-Leste Government 
issued instructions in order to regulate PSCs by 
way of Secretary of State for Security Instruction 
No. 03/OSSS/VII/2010 of 6 August 2010 (the 
“2010 Instruction”). It is the first and only specific 
regulation regarding the control of PSC activity 
in Timor-Leste. The Instruction is a remarkably 
brief document considering the subject matter with 
which it deals, consisting of only 13 clauses.  Some 
of the clauses are also rather brief, although a few, 
such as Article 10, include a number of sections and 
subsections. The Instruction does not cover or even 
mention PMCs.
5. Key Provisions of 2010 Instruction
Article 1of the 2010 Instruction defines PSCs 
as “Security Companies that provide protection of 
assets and crime prevention activities, in purpose to 
gain profit and/or income”.33 It does not provide any 
further clarification as to what constitutes a PSC.
Articles 2 and 5 detail PSC activities and duties, 
which include:34
a. protection for dynamic and static 
assets; 
b. monitoring the presence and in-out 
movement of people; 
c. prevention of firearms smuggling 
or use of prohibited materials or 
equipment that could be used to incite/
create violence; and 
d. prevention of activities involving 
assets, properties, buildings, or 
locations that could result in their 
closure to the public.
At the same time, Article 3 prohibits PSCs from 
conducting certain operations, such as:35
32  Allegations against DynCorp include: uncontrolled aerial spraying of herbicides and fumigants in the border region between Colombia and 
Ecuador to eradicate Colombian cocaine and poppy plantations, but which also caused severe health problems, and plant, crop and livestock 
destruction, see Verdict No. 1:01-cv-01908-RWR 2 Venancio Aguasanta Arias, et al., v DynCorp, et al., direct involvement in military 
counter-insurgency operations and anti-drug missions, such as special search and rescue operations and provision of helicopter gunship pilots 
against Colombian rebel groups and drug cartels. See also Departemen of National Security, 2005, Request for Training Plan and Phaseout 
Timeline for DynCorp Operations in Colombia, Transportation Security Administration, United States of America, pp. 1-2,  involvement  in 
child prostitution and slavery in Bosnia in 1999. See also Martina E. Vandenberg and Kathleen Peratis, “Trafficking of Women and Girls to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina for Forced Prostitution”, Human Rights Watch, Vol. 14, No. 19, 2002, p. 3, and involvement in hiring young boys 
as child prostitutes in Afghanistan. See also The Guardian, “US Embassy Cables: Afghan Government Asks US to Quash ‘Dancing Boys’ 
Scandal”, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/213720, accessed on 30 June 2014.
33  Article 1 DespachoNo. 03/GABSES/VII/2010 de 6 de Agosto 2010, Timor-Leste.
34 Ibid., Article 2 and 5.
35 Ibid., Article 3.
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a. prosecutions or any activities within 
the jurisdiction of the Department of 
Justice or the PNTL; 
b. activities that may threaten, prohibit, 
or restrict fundamental guarantees and 
rights; and 
c. security services for assets, activities, 
or persons that may be involved in 
illegal or criminal activities.
Article 6 also prohibits PSC owners, managers, 
or employees with fraud-related criminal records 
being involved in company activities, especially 
operational activities.36
The Instruction requires PSCs to be registered 
with the State Secretariat of Security. The nature and 
range of documentation and information required 
to obtain registration is comprehensive. It includes 
a provisional license for company and business 
activities; company address and list of assets; 
company statute, articles of association or charter; 
names of company owners and managers, as well 
as employees and their ranks or positions; design 
of the company uniform; certification that the PSC 
is not indebted to the State; copy of the company 
employee identification card; and company history 
and security services.37 While conducting security 
services, PSC employees must be in uniform and 
carry the identification card,and are prohibited from 
using firearms.38
Article 10 of the Instruction requires PSCs 
and their employees to provide assistance to, and 
cooperate with, public officials and authorities,39 
and to place themselves under the latters’ command 
if involved in operational locations.40 But all PSC 
personnel must also ensure that they distinguish 
themselves and their activities from public officials 
to avoid confusion by the public.41 PSCs and their 
personnel must keep information relating to their 
profession confidential, and ensure that it is only 
disclosed pursuant to the Penal Code and judicial 
process.42
For monitoring purposes, the Instruction 
provides that PSCs and their activities in Timor-
Leste fall under the jurisdiction of the Dirasaun 
Nasional Seguransa Publik DNSEP (Directorate for 
the National Management of Public Buildings), a 
department within the State Secretariat of Security. 
This body is charged with the responsibility of 
ensuring that PSCs conduct their activities according 
to the 2010 Instruction, and of maintaining records 
of those activities and all PSC owners, managers, 
and personnel.43
6.	 Deficiencies	of	2010	Instruction
However, the Instruction has some 
fundamental deficiencies, since it does not address 
a number of issues key to PSC operation and 
supervision, such as:
a. Standard Personnel Recruitment 
Requirements
 The Instruction does not make any 
specific provision relating to standard 
requirements for PSC personnel, 
including training, for registration 
purposes. Accordingly, requirements 
differ widely amongst local PSCs. For 
example, the PSC APAC reportedly 
requires their personnel to be “over 
18 years old, free of communicable 
diseases, in good physical condition, 
have completed secondary school, 
possess basic reading and writing 
skills, and be fluent in Tetum and/or 
Indonesian”.44 Maubere Security, on 
36  Ibid., Article 6.
37  Ibid., Article 4.
38 Ibid., Article 8 and 9.
39 Ibid., Article 10 (1).  Article 10 of the 2010 Instruction can be used in conjunction with the National Parliament Law No. 4 of 2010: Law of 
Internal Security, Article 7 (1), since both oblige PSCs and their personnel as Timor-Leste nationals/citizens to collaborate with and support 
the Timor-Leste Authority to ensure the internal security, peace, and stability of Timor-Leste.
40 Ibid., Article 10 (2).
41 Ibid., Article 10 (4).
42  Ibid., Article 10 (5) and (6).
43 Ibid., Article 11 – 13.
44 Marc von Boemcken, “Brief 45, Commercial Security and Development: Findings from Timor-Leste, Liberia and Peru”, Bonn International 
Center for Conversion,p. 24, http://www.bicc.de/uploads/tx_bicctools/brief45.pdf, accessed on 30 June 2014.
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the other hand, reportedly requires 
their personnel to “have completed 
senior high school, be at last 160 cm 
tall and have some basic knowledge of 
Portuguese and English”.45 Maubere 
also requires personnel undertake 
”one month’s training, which includes 
the improvement of foreign language 
skills as well as the basics of customer 
relations and guarding activities - to be 
regularly refreshed”.46
b. Restrictions on Affiliation	 with	
Certain Political Parties, Organi­
sations, or Groups
 Provisions prohibiting PSC affiliation 
with certain political parties, organi-
sations, or groups is very impor-
tant because of the existence of 
organisations and groups with hetero-
geneous backgrounds, in particular 
political backgrounds, amongst 
the Timor-Leste population. The 
Instruction does not make any 
provision or prohibition in respect of 
PSC involvement with political parties 
or other organisations whose intentions 
or activities may be directed towards a 
destabilisation of the present political, 
economic or social order. Hence there 
is no requirement for PSCs to remain 
neutral and independent without any 
affiliation to political organisations or 
groups. 
c. Prohibitions on Mercenary­Related 
and Subversive Activities
 Mercenary-related, subversive or other 
activities by PSCs and PMCs that 
could threaten the national integrity 
can constitute a major threat for Timor-
Leste. Again, the Instruction does not 
contain any provision relating to such 
activities. 
d. PSC Uniforms
 While the Instruction requires 
PSC personnel on operation to be 
uniformed, it makes no further 
stipulation in respect of their design or 
form. Since those used by a number of 
PSCs are similar in colour and design 
to the PNTL uniforms, confusion 
can arise amongst the Timorese in 
differentiating between PNTL officers 
and PSC personnel.47
e. Accountability and Sanctions
 The Instruction does not include 
any provisions relating to PSC 
accountability. Nor does it describe 
In any detail what may constitute 
an infringement or violation of the 
Instruction, except by implication 
of non-compliance. Accordingly, 
the Instruction does notprovide for 
any sanctions for non-compliance, 
infringement or violation.
f. PMC Regulation
 The Instruction does not regulate 
PMCs or even mention them. This is 
understandable since the Instruction 
is specifically designed for PSCs. 
However it raises concern that PMC 
operation in Timor-Leste is conducted 
entirely in a legal vacuum.
Despite these deficiencies, the 2010 
Instruction can be viewed as a reasonablycompetent 
attempt to regulate PSCs,since the absence of reports 
of infringements of the Instruction by PSCs would 
seem to indicate the companies’ general compliance.
However, it is suggested that infringements do 
occur since there are many criminal violations in 
Timor-Leste, including some committed by PSC 
personnelthat remain unreported or are simply not 
documented.
As stated by a representative of DNSEP48 and 
endorsed by the Secretary of State for Security,49 
the 2010 Instruction is intended as a temporary 
regulation until replaced by a proper and adequate 
statute. Regardless, the Instruction itself has an 
important role as it prevents a legal vacuum for 
issues relating to PSCs within the Timor-Leste legal 
system.
45 Ibid.
46  Ibid.
47  Nelson Belo, Op.cit., p. 13.
48  Interview with DNSEP representative, Dili, Timor-Leste, 29 July 2012.
49  Interview with State Secretary of Security, Fransisco da Costa Gutteres, Dili, Timor-Leste, 25 August 2013.
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The Timor-Leste Parliament is currently 
debating a new legal framework for governing 
of PSCs and their activities in Timor-Leste.50 A 
future statute needs to both develop from the 2010 
Instruction and address its deficiencies. Additionally, 
it may draw upon international initiatives on PSCs 
and PMCs51  and the national laws of the United 
States, the United Kingdom, South Africa, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Indonesia as countriesin which 
PSCs and PMCs have operated, or have suffered 
from unstable security conditionsand violence, or 
have used PSCs and PMCs to support armed forces 
operations overseas.
7. A Future PSC and PMC Statute
The exact form of Timor-Leste’sfuture statute 
is still undetermined; but because the drafting is 
being conducted within the Parliamentary context, 
it will probably be produced as an act of Parliament. 
This will give the statute much greater status and 
legal force than a Ministerial instruction or other 
delegated instrument. It is suggested that the 
Parliament has two options - to create a single statute 
that covers both PSCs and PMCs, or to create two 
separate statutes. Many of the core PSC and PMC 
provisions are similar in principle, but there are also 
essential and substantive differences between them.
a.	 Definition	 of	 The Company, Its 
Personnel and Services
A future statuteneeds to provide 
clear definition of a PSC, a PMC, and their 
legitimate activities, in order to establish 
a better understanding of their purpose and 
roles, and provide some parameters and 
limits for their necessary monitoring and 
regulation.However, the difference in the 
definition ofservices is that those provided by 
a PSC must be in the nature of contributing 
to law enforcement and crime prevention 
and available to any entity in Timor-Leste, 
including organs of the state. PMC services, 
on the other hand,are more in military in 
nature and can only be provided to the Timor-
Leste Government.
Even though these definitions are 
stillfar from satisfactory, at least theymay 
give some understanding of the nature 
and activities of both PSCs and PMCs for 
government officials and the Timor-Leste 
population in preventing the overlapping of 
tasks between the two types of companies.
b. The PSC and PMC Regulatory and 
Monitoring Body
In some respects, the PSC and PMC 
regulatory and monitoring bodies will 
have a very similar function, namely, to 
control and manage the companies and 
their activities within Timor-Leste. The 
bodies will provide company and individual 
personnel registration procedures including 
approval, renewal, revocation, refusal and 
modification, in order to produce operating 
licenses for both the companies and their 
personnel. Within the statute parameters, 
these bodies can determine permitted and 
prohibited PSCs and PMCs activities. The 
bodies can also establish a reporting and 
complaints mechanisms.
However, reflecting differences in 
their core activities, PSC and PMCs may well 
require separate regulatory and monitoring 
bodies. Assuming separate bodies are 
established, the Timor-Leste Government 
could appoint the National Management 
of Public Security (Dirasaun Nasional 
Seguransa Publik – DNSEP) as the regulatory 
and monitoring body for PSCs. This is the 
most logical option since the DNSEP already 
supervises and manages PSCs. It would also 
be logical to establish the separate PMC 
regulatory body under the authority of the 
State Secretariat of Defence, since Defence 
has both experience and responsibility for 
any military activities inside the country. 
This placement also reflects the military and 
50  Interview with State Secretary of Security, Fransisco da Costa Gutteres, Dili, Timor-Leste, 23 August 2013.
51 Such as the Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private 
Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict and the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Services Providers.
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paramilitary nature of PMCs.
c. Registration of PSCs and PMCs
The PSC regulatory and monitoring 
body provides company and individual 
registration, an essential pre-requisite l to 
obtain the licenses required to operate in 
Timor-Leste. There is currently no separate 
registration process for a PMC (unless as a 
PSC). The current PSC registration process 
requires a Commercial Licence for company 
activities, issued by the National Directorate 
for Registration and Notarial Offices of 
the Ministry of Justice,52 and a License for 
Economic Activities,53 issuedthe  by Ministry 
of Commerce, Industry and Environment.
To obtain these licenses PSCs need to first 
register with the National Directorate and the 
Ministry. 
Being inter-departmental, this regis-
tration process is very complicated and time 
consuming and can cause confusion as to 
which institution is the ‘proper’ regulatory 
body for PSCs in Timor-Leste. Efficient, 
effective regulatory and monitoring practice 
and ease of operation for all parties will follow 
if the one body is responsible for monitoring, 
for registration and for the issuance of the 
necessary operating licences. 
For registration, where none currently 
exists, a PMC should be required to obtain 
authorisation and an operating license from 
its own regulatory and monitoring body in 
order to conduct operations. The operating 
license must encompass the following 
conditions and information: 
1) PMC services to be limited to 
Timor-Leste only; 
2) PMC personnel and subcontrac-
tors involved in the contract;
3) registration of individual PMC 
personnel; 
4) registration of equipment, in-
cluding firearms, to be used. 
Since PMC registration includes 
firearms and other weapons directly 
supporting the company’s services and 
activities, it can be also be utilised as a 
preventive measure against equipment that 
could be used to hinder the stability and 
security of the country, illegal weapons or 
firearms transfer, and as a control on the 
types and quantity of weapons that might 
imported, acquired and used by PMCs in an 
area of operation. 
d. Registration of PSC and PMC 
Personnel
Individual registration of PSC and 
PMC personnel complements company 
registration and is a key element in the 
proper regulation and monitoring of PSC and 
PMC activity. Individual registration should 
require that the applicant:
1) be a Timorese citizen, at least 
18 years of age (being minimum 
adult age under Timor-Leste 
law), and physically and men-
tally sound;
2) have complied with the training 
requirements prescribed for 
registration;
3) have not been under investiga-
tion for a crime or found guilty 
or improper conduct under any 
applicable Timor-Leste regula-
tion;
4) not currently be a member of the 
PNTL or the F-FDTL.
PMC individual registration should further 
require details of nationality, country of 
origin, background54 and evidence of no 
52  See Código de Registo Comercial (aprovado pelo Decreto-Lei nº 7 of 2006 de 1 de Março de 2006), Preamble 1.
53  See Decreto-Lei nº 24 of 2011 de 8 de Junho 2011: Licenciamento das Actividades Comercias.
54 Background checks will require no criminal record or involvement in crimes committed in another country or categorised as violations or 
grave breach of international law; no record of misuse/abuse of alcohol, drugs, or other illicit substances. It will also require any record of 
military training or service, PMC service training, and weapons and firearms training.
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current active membership of publicsecurity, 
military, intelligence, or secret services of a 
foreign country.
e. Determination of PSC and PMC 
Services
Whether the government opts for the 
aforementioned single-statute option or the 
dual-statute option, the legislative framework 
must draw a clear distinction between PSC 
and PMC services and those that are the 
responsibility of the public security forces, the 
judiciary or the defence forces. For example, 
PSCs and PMCs cannot be permitted to 
conduct any activities relating to criminal 
prosecution or activities that restrict personal 
freedoms, including basic human rights. In 
addition, both should be prohibited from 
providing or making their services available 
to any parties involved in criminal activities. 
The future statute should also 
prohibit PSC or PMC affiliation with 
certain political parties, organisations, or 
groups – a particularly important provision 
in the current fragile security situation in 
the country and the prevalence of hostility 
between organisations and groups within the 
population. Such provision will contribute 
significantly to the reduction or elimination 
of conflicts of interest that otherwise exist 
and could continue to occur within PSCs and 
PMCs. A similar practice has occurred in 
Ecuador where PSCs have become a stop-gap 
measure to provide assistance to the police 
forces until the police forces have sufficient 
numbers and capacity for the enforcement of 
law and order and public security.55
However, PSC personnel must 
distinguish themselves and their activities 
from the public officials to avoid public 
confusion.The PSC future statute or PSC-
specific provisions must mandate that PSCs 
and their personnel shall cooperate with, and 
provide assistance to, public security and 
law enforcement officials and authorities, 
and to place themselves under the latters’ 
command in the event of intervention in 
operation locations. One element of the 
provision of assistance and cooperation 
includes maintenance of confidentiality of 
information obtained in the course of their 
professional activities, but also disclosure of 
such information to authorities in accordance 
with the Timor-Leste Penal Code.The PMC 
future statute or PMC-specific provisions 
may not include similar provision in respect 
of giving assistance and cooperation to the 
civilian authority.
Peculiar to the PMC future statute 
or PMC-specific provisions should be 
requirements that PMCs are prohibited 
from conducting activities exclusively the 
responsibility of the F-FNTL, such as direct 
participation in armed conflict that may occur 
inside Timor-Leste or any activity to maintain 
national defence.
f. PSC Uniforms
The future statute must contain more 
detailed provisions on uniforms than those 
currently in the 2010 Instruction.56 There are 
several reports of PNTL officers assaulting 
PSC employees wearing similar uniforms to 
the PNTL.57 Because of the PNTL actions, 
PSC personnel choose to remove their 
uniforms while on duty and wear plain 
clothes so as to avoid such problems with 
the PNTL.58 This in turn makes it even more 
difficult to distinguish PSCs employees from 
the civilian population. 
55  See United Nations, Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Mission to Ecuador, UN Document A/HRC/4/42/Add.2, 9 [21].
56  Nelson Belo, Op.cit., p. 13.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
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g. PSC and PMC Accountability and 
Sanctions
Both PSCs and PMCs, as private 
companies, have responsibilities and 
obligations under Timor-Leste laws, the 
laws of the countries where they operate, 
and the laws of the country of origin of their 
personnel.59 Hence both companies and their 
personnel should be held accountable under 
the future statute for any wrongdoing under 
Timor-Leste law, whether they themselves 
commit the wrongdoings or encourage, 
order, or assist others to do so.60 In particular, 
PSC owners and management must also be 
held accountable, since they have capacity 
to direct personnel and control them legally 
and financially.61 They should also be held 
accountable for failure to take necessary 
measures to prevent wrongdoings where 
they know or culpably ought to have known 
of potential or actual wrongdoings.62 The 
accountability need not be limited to the 
PSC itself but might also be attributable 
to its clients, where the wrongdoing was 
committed on behalf of or acknowledged by 
its clients or under client contracts. 
The future statute could follow the 
example of the South African regulation 
on accountability and sanctions for any 
transgressions and breaches of statutory 
instructions. Transgressions could include 
conspiracy, incitement or attempt to commit 
a transgression.63
PSC and PMC sanctions generally 
could be similar. They can include temporary 
or permanent revocation or suspension of 
company registration and license, financial 
penalties or imprisonment or a combination 
thereof, in accordance with the Timor-Leste 
Penal Code and other national laws. But there 
are additional sanctions for established PMC 
wrongdoings, such as contract termination, 
prohibition on future contracts, visa 
cancellationsand deportation. Irrespective 
of whether the available sanctions apply to 
one or both PSCs and PMCs, they must be 
of sufficient gravity and severity to act as a 
deterrent.
8. Facing Challenges
Enacting a legal framework for PSCs and 
PMCs will be challenging, since the Timor-Leste 
Government still faces major issues of weak 
institutional capacity in areas of parliamentary 
activity and rule of law. Allegations regularly arise 
of some members of Parliament misusing their 
positions, and of widespread levels of corruption 
and nepotism inside public institutions.64 In 
addition, a general lack of understanding about 
PSCs and PMCs has potential to frustrate attempts 
to make appropriate regulation for the companies. 
Parliament may have some understanding of PSCs 
since Timor-Leste has regulated the PSC industry 
within its legal system. But it is a different situation 
with respect to PMCs, since Parliament is unlikely 
to understand the company and the services it 
might offer. Accordingly, there are grounds for 
concern that Parliament may be unable to enact an 
appropriate legal framework for PSCs and PMCs 
for these reasons. 
The implementation of the future statute will 
also presentmajor challenges. Enforcement will be 
difficult and problematic if government departments 
59 Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Op.cit., p. 546.
60 Chia Lehnardt, “Individual Liability of Private Military Personnel under International Criminal Law”, European Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 19, No. 5, 2008, p. 1022.
61 Ibid.,  pp. 1027 and 74.
62  Ibid., p. 1028.
63  For example Chapter 3 (26) number (1) alphabet (a) and (b) Private Security Industry Regulatory Act No. 56 of 2001, South Africa.
64 See US Agency for International Development, “Corruption Assessment: Timor-Leste”, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADQ697.pdf, 
accessed on 30 June 2014. See also East Timor Law and Justice Bulletin, “Prime Minister Gusmao Lashes out at Anti-Corruption Commission”, 
http://www.easttimorlawandjusticebulletin.com/2013/04.html, accessed on 13 April 2014.
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lack adequate knowledge and understanding about 
the future statute, and about PSCs and PMCs. 
Similar difficulty can also occur with judicial 
institutions and Timor-Leste society generally. 
Inadequate knowledge and understanding within 
judicial institutions will adversely affect their ability 
to properly deal with crimes or misconduct by PSCs 
and PMCs. Timor-Leste society, as part of a wider 
societal monitoring mechanism of PSCs and PMCs, 
may be unable or unwilling to provide information 
onPSC and PMC activities and operations when 
they do not understand the future statute and the 
organisations involved.  In order to deal with such 
difficulties, dissemination of information on the 
future statute, and on PSCs and PMCs needs to be 
conducted at all levels of Timor-Leste society.
Lack of resources can also become an 
obstacle in the enforcement of the future statute, 
particularly human resources and facilities that 
support enforcement. Furthermore, they need to 
be supported with sufficient equipment in order to 
conduct the enforcement activities. 
Politicisation and abuse of power in 
government institutions, as has occurred in the 
police and defence forces by some political leaders 
in order to achieve their own political objectives, 
can hinder implementation of the future statute.65 
Misuse of authority can circumvent a future statute, 
as shown in Afghanistan when President Karzai 
circumvented his own decree for the benefit of 
his brother’s PSC.66 Such improper intervention 
in government institutions dealing with PSCs and 
PMCs will disturb the proper implementation and 
enforcement the statute. It may also exacerbate 
corruption, since such political intervention is solely 
directed towards their own financial gain. 
Even though the implementation of the 
future statute may face these issues, it can still 
be implemented and followed by the companies 
concerned. PSCs appear to have reasonably 
complied with the 2010 Instructionin general 
since there are no confirmed reports of any grave 
violations by them. This past performance gives 
grounds for confidence that the statute is likely to 
be followed by PSCs and PMCs in similar fashion. 
Even where implementation challenges 
exist, there are also ways to overcome them. First, 
an education strategy for government officials, 
non-government organisations, and business and 
industry, which would include training programs 
regarding PSCs and PMCs, is essential in order 
to provide a proper understanding and knowledge 
relating to these companies and their operations. 
The strategy should include the PSC and PMC legal 
framework, the nature, function and activities of 
PSCs and PMCs, and how they are equipped and 
operate in their areas of operation, and so forth.
Second, clear and comprehensive instructions 
and regulations will also reduce the possibilities 
and likelihood of government officials acting 
with politicised motives and misusing authority, 
by giving notice to all that non-adherence will 
constitute a breach and that stipulated consequences 
follow. 
Third, the availability of policies and 
guidelines through print and electronic media 
regarding PSCs and PMCs will enable the Timor-
Leste population to be informed about these 
companies, and their operation and regulation. This 
will improve the informal monitoring role that the 
population can play in respect of the companies 
and their operations. In addition, these policies and 
guidelines can become social control tools for the 
government when it has enacted and implemented 
the PSC and PMC legal framework properly. 
Fourth, the government must allocate 
funding to improve and provide the required 
facilities and personnel until they reach an 
appropriate quantum to support the effective 
implementation and enforcement of the PSC and 
65  Security Sector Reform Resource Centre, “Country Profile: Timor-Leste”, http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/
Country-Profile-Timor-Leste-April-7.pdf, accessed on 30 June 2014.
66 See Nadene Ghouri, “How to Make a Killing in Kabul: Western Security and a Crisis in Afghanistan”, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/home/
moslive/article-1360216.html, accessed on 30 June 2014.
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PMC legal framework. An appropriate source of 
funding for these initiatives would be ministerial 
operational budgets, in particular from the Ministry 
of Defence and Security or the Ministry of Justice. 
Another option can be from the Petroleum Fund 
whichderives revenues from the Timor Gap oil and 
gas fields royalties.    
However, both options also present 
difficulties. Allocation of funding from both 
Ministries’ operational budgets and the Petroleum 
Fund needs to be approved and regulated within the 
annual state budget by Parliament. Unless funding 
has been so approved and regulated for the fiscal 
year, it may become just one of many priorities of 
the related ministries, and subject to competition 
from other projects, external pressures and lobbying. 
Unless Parliament sets funding, the PSC and PMC 
legal framework implementation will suffer from 
paucity of effective decision-making and funding.
D. Conclusion
The presence in Timor-Leste of PSCs, and 
to a lesser extent PMCs, has brought some positive 
developments to domestic commerce, industry 
and society. The companies have contributed 
to the recovery efforts of Timor-Leste, ranging 
from providing logistical support to providing 
workplace opportunities that have helped to reduce 
the national unemployment rate. Furthermore, the 
companieshave had a big impact on the security 
development of Timor-Leste since they have been 
variously a stop-gap, or a support, or a supplement 
for the PNTL, while that body has attempted to 
build its capacity and capability to conduct effective 
and comprehensive security operations. 
The contribution of PSCs can be seen in the 
area of economic and social development. With 
Timor-Leste having an unemployment rate around 
18.5%, PSCs are one of the largest job providers 
in the state, and a growing business sector which 
contributes to reducing the rate of unemployment 
amongst the Timor-Leste population. They have not 
posed a threat to human rights and appear to have 
been generally law abiding.67
The Timor-Leste government views PSCs 
as having an important role in continuing to 
contribute to the maintenance of law and order 
through positive relations and cooperation with 
government agencies, since both share the same 
objective of providing and guaranteeing security to 
society.68 However, they still need to be regulated 
and managed within an appropriate framework as 
part of theTimor-Leste legal system. Control and 
proper management is essential for continuation of 
their positive contributions towards the prevention 
of conflict and the promotion of peace and stability 
in re-building the country.
67  Marc von Boemcken, “Brief 45, Commercial Security and Development: Findings from Timor-Leste, Liberia and Peru”, http://www.bicc.de/
uploads/tx_bicctools/brief45.pdf, accessed on 30 June 2014.
68  See Nelson Belo, Loc.cit.
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